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 Demand Curve Shifts in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment 
 
Abstract 
Basic economic theory predicts that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good is affected by the 
presence of complements and substitutes.  In an auction setting, this theory implies that the 
presence of complements would increase bid prices for a good, while the presence of substitutes 
would decrease bid prices for a good.  However, several experimental auction studies have sold 
complementary or substitutable products without regard for the effects these actions could have 
on bidding behavior.  Using data from an experimental auction specifically designed to test the 
effect of complements and substitutes on bids, we used both unconditional tests and conditional 
tests where we derived demand flexibilities to analyze whether selling complementary and 
substitutable products has an effect on bids.  Our results show that the availability of 
complementary and substitutable products affects bids in the expected directions.  This finding 
has important implications for researchers who design experimental auctions. 
 
Introduction 
  One of economic theory’s most basic predictions is that consumer demand is affected by 
the availability of substitutes or complements.  In the context of auctions, this prediction implies 
that the bids submitted for a good should increase when auction participants also have the chance 
to win a complementary good, and that these bids should decrease when they also have the 
chance to win a substitute good.
1  But researchers who use experimental auctions in consumer 
demand studies are typically only interested in estimating the value of a good in isolation, and 
therefore wish to avoid the confounding effects introduced by complements and substitutes.  To 
1 deal with this potential problem, many researchers choose to elicit bids for several products, with 
the understanding that only one of the products being bid on will actually be sold (e.g., Roosen et 
al., 1998).  Other researchers allow for the possibility that a participant may win more than one 
good, but are careful to ensure that those goods are unrelated (e.g., Rousu et al., 2004).  Others, 
despite the predictions of economic theory, allow participants to win multiple goods that are 
clearly complements or substitutes for one another (e.g., Noussair et al., 2002; Umberger et al., 
2002; Noussair et al., 2004). 
While economic theory predicts auction participants will change their bids in the 
presence of complements or substitutes, we know of only one paper that has addressed this issue.  
List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) examine sales of multiple units that were identical (i.e., perfect 
substitutes) and find that consumers lower their bids for the second unit of a commodity, as 
expected.  However, no research has examined the impact that selling complements or non-
identical substitutes will have on bids submitted in experimental auctions.   
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways.  First, we report the results 
of an experimental auction for three commonly consumed food products to test if consumers 
change their bidding behavior when they may win multiple products that are complements or 
substitutes.  Given the explosion of papers using experimental auctions, this paper provides 
timely insight into an issue that is often overlooked by experimental economists.  Second, to 
assist in estimating the effects of complements and substitutes, our experimental design allows us 
to estimate demand flexibilities (the inverse-demand counterpart to demand elasticities).  To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate demand flexibilities using experimental auctions.  
Given the fundamental nature of elasticities and flexibilities in economics analysis, we hope this 
paper will help assist in expanding the use of demand flexibilities in experimental auctions. 
2 Experimental Design 
Ninety-four undergraduate students took part in this study.  All of these students were 
enrolled in Principles of Economics courses at a large Midwestern university.  The participants 
bid on combinations of the following three food products in a series of 25 rounds:  a 16-ounce jar 
of salsa, an 8-ounce bag of plain-labeled tortilla chips, and an 8-ounce bag of tortilla chips 
labeled “Made in America from American Ingredients.”  We chose these specific products 
because we believed it was likely that the participants would be familiar with them.  The labels 
were kept basic to avoid the potential of a label’s design affecting bids and confounding our 
results. 
Three elements of our experimental design warrant careful discussion:  the auction 
mechanisms used, the rounds of bidding, and the specific steps in the auction. 
To ensure that our results were not simply an artifact of the auction mechanism used, we 
varied the auction mechanism across treatments.  Participants in both treatments bid using 
auction mechanisms that are demand revealing (i.e., bidding one’s true value is a weakly 
dominant strategy).  In the first treatment, participants bid on goods using the second-price, 
sealed-bid auction (Vickrey, 1961).  In the second treatment, participants bid on goods using the 
random nth-price auction (Shogren et al., 2001).  In the second-price, sealed-bid auction, each 
participant submits a sealed bid for a product.  The auction monitor sorts the bids from highest to 
lowest and the highest bidder wins the auction and pays the second highest bid price for the 
product.  The random nth-price auction differs only in that the monitor randomly selects a 
number between 2 and N (where N is the number of participants), and the bid price 
corresponding to that number becomes the nth price.  The n – 1 bidders who submitted bids 
higher than the nth price then purchase the product paying the randomly selected nth price.
2  
3 Participants bid on the food products in two sessions, each with multiple rounds.  The 
ordering of these sessions was varied across treatments, and the ordering of rounds was varied 
across participants.  Participants understood that, though they were submitting bids in multiple 
rounds, only one of those rounds would be chosen as binding (or valid).  In order to avoid 
affiliation of bids across participants, no market prices were posted. 
Session A consisted of 19 rounds of bidding.  In each round, participants bid on various 
combinations of food products, as described in Table 1.  These participants bid on one unit of 
each product individually, two units of each product individually, and three units of each product 
individually.  They also participated in 10 additional rounds, where they bid on different 
combinations of multiple products.  Structuring the experiment in this way allows us to obtain 
own-price flexibilities, because participants are bidding on more than one unit of each product.  
We can also obtain cross-price flexibilities, because participants are bidding on combinations of 
different products. 
Session B consisted of six rounds of bidding.  Participants understood that, if one of these 
six rounds was chosen as the binding round, each of the participants would be endowed with one 
unit of a good and that they were bidding to purchase an additional unit (of the same good or of a 
different good, depending on the round).
3 
The experiment included seven steps.  In Step 1, the participants arrived, completed a 
consent form, and were paid $5 for participating.  Each participant was also assigned an I.D. 
number, in order to maintain anonymity. 
In Step 2, participants were given instructions (both written and oral) on the auction 
mechanism to be used in that treatment.  Participants then took a short quiz on the specific details 
of the auction mechanism. 
4 In Step 3, participants took part in a series of three practice auctions.  In the first practice 
round, all participants submitted a sealed bid to purchase one Hershey’s candy bar.  In the second 
practice round, participants submitted a sealed bid to purchase one Hershey’s candy bar and one 
Krackel candy bar.  In the third practice round, participants were told that, if this round were 
chosen as the binding round, everyone in the room would be given a Hershey’s candy bar, and 
the auction winners would also purchase a Krackel candy bar.  The participants then submitted a 
sealed bid to “upgrade” from a Hershey’s bar to a Hershey’s bar and a Krackel bar.  After these 
rounds were completed, the monitor announced which round was to count as the binding round 
and determined the winner(s) (by determining the second price in the second-price treatment or 
by choosing the nth price in the nth-price treatment).  These practice rounds were sufficient to 
ensure that participants understood both the auction mechanism and the format of the upcoming 
rounds—that the auction would involve several rounds, that only one round would be binding, 
and that in some of the rounds they would be bidding to upgrade from one unit to two. 
In Step 4, participants were given the chance to examine the three food products for sale 
in the auction.  Depending on the experimental unit, they began by bidding in either Session A or 
Session B.  In both sessions, the order that participants bid on the food products was randomized 
to reduce any potential order effects.
4 
In Step 5, participants bid in Session A or Session B, whichever session they did not bid 
in during Step 4. 
In Step 6, the monitor announced the binding round.  If the binding round was from 
Session B, the endowed good was distributed at this point in the experiment.  Next, the auction 
winners were determined, and any transactions agreed to were carried out.   
5 In Step 7, all participants completed a questionnaire eliciting background and 
demographic information, which concluded the experiment. 
While we followed standard experimental auction procedures (e.g., Shogren et al., 1994), 
we made several refinements to enhance our experimental design.  First, we did not post market 
prices for products, as recent evidence indicates that experimental participants can be influenced 
by a “posted-price” effect (List and Shogren, 1999; Corrigan and Rousu, 2003).  Second, we 
randomized the order of the rounds across participants.  Doing so ensured that the order of 
bidding did not systematically influence our results.  Third, we sold multiple units of 
commodities across rounds, thus allowing us to estimate demand flexibilities.  Most 
experimental auctions only sell one unit of a good, which prevents estimation of demand 
flexibilities. 
Econometric Model  
Participants in our auctions bid on multiple units of the three products.  To examine 
preferences for these products, we first needed to determine the marginal valuations (prices) for 
each product.  When only one unit of a product was available, this task was trivial, because we 
could simply use the bid price submitted.  However, when two units were available, the process 
was more complicated.  To obtain the marginal valuation for the second unit, we took a 
participant’s total bid for two units and subtracted his bid for one unit of the product.
5  This 
formula allows us to calculate a bid price for the second unit of the commodity.  We used a 
similar process to determine the bid price for the third unit of the commodity.
6 
We used logarithmic models to estimate inverse demand equations, as we expected a 
nonlinear demand curve.  An advantage to using logarithmic models when estimating 
conventional demand equations is that the coefficients represent demand elasticities.  In these 
6 conventional markets, quantity is a function of price, given that consumers face a fixed price and 
must then determine the quantity they demand.  In an auction framework, however, price is a 
function of quantity, given that participants face a fixed shift in quantity and must then determine 
the price they are willing to pay.  Because of this feature, we estimate the inverse demand for 
these products.  Thus, our measures of responsiveness are demand flexibilities rather than 
elasticities.  Demand flexibility measures the responsiveness of consumer bid prices to the 
quantity available and is analogous to the more familiar price-elasticity measures used in 
analyzing regular demand curves. 
The bid prices submitted in our auctions for each of the three products are hypothesized 
to be dependent on the quantity of the product available, the presence and quantity of 
complementary or substitutable products, and the participants’ demographic characteristics, as 
shown for each product in Equations 1 through 3: 
(1) ln  P
Salsa = α + β1 ln Q
Salsa + β2 ln Q
pl–ch + β3 ln Q
US–ch + γX + ε 
(2) ln  P
pl–ch = α + β1 ln Q
Salsa + β2 ln Q
pl–ch + β3 ln Q
US–ch + γX + ε 
(3) ln  P
US–ch = α + β1 ln Q
Salsa + β2 ln Q
pl–ch + β3 ln Q
US–ch + γX + ε 
In Equations 1 through 3, P is the bid price submitted by the participants, Q is the 
quantity of each product available and β the corresponding coefficient, X is a vector of 
demographic characteristics, γ is the corresponding set of coefficients, and ε is the random error 
term.  The pl-ch superscript refers to plain-labeled chips.  The US-ch superscript refers to chips 
labeled “Made in America from American Ingredients.” 
Because we used a log specification, zero bid prices cannot be used.  Thus, bid prices of 
zero were changed to equal bid prices of 1/100
th of a penny ($0.0001).
7  In addition, when one of 
7 the complementary or substitutable products was not available to be bid on (i.e., a zero quantity 
was available); we changed the zero quantities to 0.0001, so that the model was defined. 
In only one of the 19 rounds were all three products available in positive quantities.  To 
accurately estimate the own bid price for the regressions shown in Equations 1 through 3, rounds 
where the quantity of the own good was zero were deleted.  For example, to estimate Equation 1 
(the log bid price for salsa), we only use the observations where there were one, two, or three 
units of salsa available, not the observations where zero units of salsa were available.
8   For each 
equation, there are 10 observations for each participant; therefore, we estimated Equations 1 
through 3 using a random effects model.
9   
 
Results 
We discuss both unconditional results and conditional results from estimating demand 
flexibilities.  First consider the unconditional results.   The mean bids for the products are shown 
in Table 2.  To better understand how movements of a participant’s demand curve could affect 
bidding behavior, consider Equation 4, which would hold in the absence of demand curve shifts 
or a binding budget constraint: 
(4)  () () ( ) Bid A Bid B Bid A B += + . 
According to Equation (4), if participants place separate bids on products A and B (when they 
know they cannot win both products), the sum of their bids to purchase both products 
individually should equal their bid to purchase both products A and B together.  When products 
are complements, economic theory predicts that the right-hand side of Equation 4 will be greater 
than the left-hand side.  When the products are substitutes, theory predicts that the right-hand 
8 side of Equation 4 will be less than the left-hand side.  Figure 1 shows the expected shift in 
demand when a complementary product is presented to consumers. 
Table 3 compares the sum of the individual bids for two products with the bids for the 
pair of products sold together.  This comparison allows us to test Equation 4, which will provide 
insight into how bidding behavior changes in the presence of complements or substitutes.  When 
the two products sold are complements, the bid for the pair of items when sold together is greater 
than the sum of the bids for each item individually.  A nonparametric, one-sided Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test shows that these results are statistically significant at the 1-percent level for the 
American-labeled chips and salsa, but only marginally significant for the plain-labeled chips and 
salsa (p value = 0.06).
10  
When the two products are substitutes (the two bags of tortilla chips), the bids for the pair 
of products when sold together is smaller than the sum of the bids for each item individually.  
This result is statistically significant at the 1-percent level using a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (at the 5-percent level using a one-sided t-test).  Our results show that both 
complementary and substitutable products affect consumer bids in a way that is consistent with 
economic theory.  Further, more than 44 percent of participants shifted their demand when 
presented with multiple products.
11  These results have implications for researchers who wish to 
use experimental auctions to estimate the value of multiple goods.  With a large percentage of 
participants changing their bids in the presence of complements or substitutes, researchers who 
sell related products in an experimental auction run the risk of biasing their results either upward 
or downward. 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the conditional results from the random effects regressions.  
Table 4 shows the results of the regression examining the bid price for the bag of plain-labeled 
9 tortilla chips.  The coefficients for the log of the quantities available are of most interest in this 
analysis, because these coefficients are the demand flexibilities.  The own-quantity flexibility is 
approximately –1.1, which indicates that a 10-percent increase in the quantity of tortilla chips 
available would cause consumers to bid approximately 11 percent less.
12 
The cross-flexibilities show how a change in the quantity of American-labeled chips or 
salsa available changes the bid price for plain-labeled tortilla chips.  The cross-flexibility for 
American-labeled tortilla chips is approximately zero.  The cross-flexibility for salsa on the price 
of plain-labeled tortilla chips is small, 0.06, but is statistically significant.  This relationship 
indicates that a 10-percent increase in the availability of salsa would yield a 0.6-percent increase 
in the bid prices for plain-labeled tortilla chips, thereby indicating that the consumers in the 
experiment considered tortilla chips and salsa complements, as expected. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the demands for the American-labeled chips and the jar of salsa.  
The own-price flexibility for American-labeled tortilla chips is close to –1, while the own-price 
flexibility for the jar of salsa is approximately –2, confirming that consumers are very sensitive 
to the quantity of salsa available, because the price participants would pay diminishes rapidly 
with an increase in the quantity sold.  The cross-price flexibilities are similar to those for the 
plain-labeled tortilla chips, in that the cross-price flexibilities for the American-labeled tortilla 
chips and the jar of salsa are small but display the expected complementary relationship. 
In addition, we include several background and demographic variables in order to 
examine their impact on the bids for these three products.  However, only the participants’ race 
had a statistically significant impact on the bid prices; white participants bid less for all products.  
This result is statistically significant at the 5-percent level for tortilla chips but only significant at 
the 10-percent level for the jar of salsa and the bag of American-labeled chips. 
10 While we think that designing an experimental auction such that it allows researchers to 
estimate demand flexibilities is a methodological advancement, two caveats should be 
mentioned.  First, we found evidence of colinearity in some regressions.  Thus, the regression 
coefficients should be interpreted with some care.  Second, in order to estimate our model, we 
had to correct for the zero quantities available in the auction.  However, given that elasticities 
and flexibilities are commonly reported in almost all other fields within economics, we think this 
paper provides an important first step in introducing a design that allows for the estimation of 
demand flexibilities.  
 
Conclusion and Significance 
Despite the predictions of economic theory, several recent experimental auctions 
examining consumer behavior have allowed auction participants to win several goods that were 
close substitutes.  Until this study, however, there was no empirical evidence that selling 
complements or substitutes together in the same auction could affect consumer bids.  This paper 
reports the results of an experimental auction designed to test whether complements or 
substitutes affect participants’ bids. 
We find that, when bidding on a product, participants bid more when also bidding on a 
complementary product and bid less when also bidding on a substitutable product.  These 
findings suggest that value estimates from auctions where participants could possibly win 
multiple substitute goods may understate the goods’ values in isolation.  This is likely to occur in 
the experimental auction studies that have allow consumers to win multiple products that are 
close substitutes.   The opposite is true if the goods are viewed as complementary.  We also 
11 estimated demand flexibilities that confirmed the unconditional results: the presence of 
complements increased bids, while the presence of substitutes decreased bids.   
These results have implications for the design of experimental auctions.  Researchers 
who wish to sell multiple goods should attempt to ensure that the goods are neither complements 
nor substitutes (e.g., Huffman et al., 2004).  Another alternative is to collect bids on multiple 
products in different auction rounds and then randomly select one binding round.  Using this 
method, participants can win one good at most (e.g., Roosen et al., 1998).  This paper has shown 
that the results from studies that sell complementary or substitutable goods may be confounded 




1 Ausubel and Cramton (2002) developed a theory that explores this point for substitutes.  The 
FCC’s spectrum auctions are an example of a non-experimental auction where participants may 
bid on many complementary and substitutable items (e.g., see Cramtom, 2003). 
2 The complete set of instructions given to participants is available from the authors upon 
request.  
3 The results from these six rounds are not reported in this paper but instead are reported in a 
complementary paper that examines the persistence of the endowment effect. 
4 For evidence on how ordering matters in experimental auctions, see Huffman et al. (2003). 
5 Note that in rounds where multiple products were being auctioned, participants placed one bid 
price for obtaining a bundle of multiple products. 
6 Recall that we used different auction mechanisms for different participants.  Statistical tests 
could not reject the null hypothesis that there was no difference between the bids from 
participants using the separate auction mechanisms.  Because the treatments were independent of 
one another and the bids did not differ significantly, we pooled the data across auction 
mechanisms. 
7 We also ran regressions with zero bid prices estimated at 0.001 (higher) and 0.00001 (lower).  
The results were qualitatively similar to the results we report in this paper. 
8 We could have estimated a “choke price” (i.e., the price at which quantity demanded would be 
zero) and then used all observations.  But, because the choke price would have been estimated by 
the regressions shown in Equations 1 through 3, we saw no advantages to using that method. 
13  
9 We also ran a fixed effects model and found the same qualitative results, which are available 
from the authors upon request.  A Hausman test indicated no significant differences between the 
fixed and random effects models (Hausman and Taylor, 1981).   
10 Using a t-test, we obtain similar results with two-sided p-values of 0.01 and 0.07, respectively. 
11 The table that contains this result can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
12 We also ran these models correcting for censoring of the dependent variable and found similar 
results.  This is to be expected because approximately 90 percent of the bids were greater than 
zero.  
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America-Labeled Chips  Quantity of Salsa 
1 1  0  0 
2 2  0  0 
3 3  0  0 
4 0  1  0 
5 0  2  0 
6 0  3  0 
7 0  0  1 
8 0  0  2 
9 0  0  3 
10 1  1  0 
11 1  0  1 
12 0  1  1 
13 2  1  0 
14 2  0  1 
15 0  2  1 
16 1  2  0 
17 0  1  2 
18 1  0  2 
19 1  1  1 
 
16 Table 2.  Mean Bids (N=94) 
 














          
First bag of plain-labeled 
chips 
$0.51 0.28  0.51  0  2.00 
          
Second bag of plain-labeled 
chips 
$0.45 0.25  0.50  0.00  2.00 
          
Third bag of plain-labeled 
chips 
$0.40 0.25  0.77  -3.00  5.00 
          
First bag of American-
labeled chips 
$0.58 0.48  0.56  0  2.25 
          
Second bag of American-
labeled chips 
$0.52 0.25  0.62  -0.50  2.80 
          
Third bag of American-
labeled chips 
$0.45 0.25  0.65  -3.00  2.30 
          
First jar of salsa  $0.65  0.50  0.57  0  2.30 
          
Second jar of salsa  $0.55  0.36  0.62  -0.20  2.50 
          
Third jar of salsa  $0.40  0.25  0.70  -2.50  2.01 
 
 
Part B: Bids for Combinations of 2 Items 
 
          
1 bag of plain-labeled chips 
and 1 bag of American-
labeled chips 
1.03 0.95  0.95  0  4.25 
          
1 bag of plain-labeled chips 
and 1 jar of salsa 
1.24 1.00  1.10  0  5.50 
          
1 bag of American-labeled 
chips and 1 jar of salsa 
1.31 1.00  1.08  0  5.00 
17 Table 3.  How Do Bids Change in Bundles of Complements or Substitutes?  The Value Is the 
Bid for the Bundle of Goods Minus the Sum of the Individual Bids for the Products (N=94). 
 
Products Mean  Deviation 
   
Plain-labeled chips and jar of salsa  0.09 
Standard deviation  (0.58) 
   
American-labeled chips and jar of salsa  0.16 ** 
Standard deviation  (0.57) 
   
Plain-labeled chips and American-labeled chips  -0.06 ** 
Standard deviation  (0.30) 
 




18 Table 4.  Random Effects Model 
Dependent variable:  log of bid price for plain-labeled tortilla chips 











Log (quantity of plain-











Log (quantity of American-







































GPA         –0.07 
(0.20) 
 
**   Statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
*   Statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
19 Table 5.  Random Effects Model 
Dependent variable:  log of bid price for American-labeled tortilla chips 
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GPA       –0.07 
(0.20) 
 
**   Statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
*   Statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
20 Table 6.  Random Effects Model 
Dependent variable:  Log of bid price for salsa 
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GPA         0.10 
(0.18) 
 
**   Statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
*   Statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
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